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We appreciate the opportunity to present on behalf of the National Council of
Agricultural Employers a statement on the future of agricultural labor and the public policy
issues related to the need for an adequate legal workforce to meet the needs of America’s
farmers and ranchers.  Agriculture currently has a shortage of legal workers.  As a result,
NCAE believes legislative action is necessary to provide legal status to the current agricultural
workforce and to reform the H-2A alien agricultural worker program.
The National Council of Agricultural Employers (NCAE) is a Washington, D.C. based
national association representing growers and agricultural organizations on agricultural labor and
employment issues.  NCAE’s membership includes agricultural employers in fifty states who
employ approximately 75 percent of the nation’s hired farm workforce.  Its members include
growers, farm cooperatives, packers, processors and agricultural associations.  NCAE was
actively involved in the legislative process that resulted in the enactment of the Immigration
Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986.  NCAE’s respresentation of agricultural employers
gives it the background and experience to provide meaningful comments and insights into issues
concerning immigration policy and how it affects the employment practices of its members’
businesses and the availability of an adequate agricultural labor supply.
Why is a program for the legal employment of alien agricultural workers needed?
While the United States agricultural industry is overwhelmingly an industry of family
farms and small businesses, it is also heavily dependent on hired labor.  More than 600,000
farms hire some labor during any given year.  Hired labor accounts, on average, for about $1 of
every $8 of farm production expenses.  In the labor intensive fruit, vegetable and horticultural
sectors, hired labor costs average 25 to 35 percent of total production costs, and in some
individual commodities the percentage is much higher.  2
Even in labor intensive commodities, however, most of the production processes are
mechanized.  Typically the farm family and perhaps a few hired workers do all the farm work
most of the year.  But large numbers of hired workers are needed for short periods to perform
certain very labor intensive tasks such as harvesting, thinning or pruning.  In many crops these
labor intensive tasks, particularly harvesting, must be performed during very brief windows of
opportunity, the timing of which can not be  predicted with precision and which is beyond
growers’ control.  The availability of sufficient labor at the right time to perform these labor
intensive functions can determine whether or not the farm produces a saleable product for that
growing season.
The United States has some of the best climatic and natural resources in the world for
agricultural production, and especially for the production of labor intensive fruits, vegetables
and horticultural crops.  In a world economy where all resources, including labor, were mobile
and there were no trade barriers so that all countries could specialize in those commodities in
which they have a comparative advantage, the North American continent would be, as it in fact
is, one of the major world producers of agricultural commodities, including fruits, vegetables
and horticultural specialties.
During the last several decades, markets for labor intensive commodities have
expanded dramatically in the United States and throughout the world.  This dramatic expansion
has resulted from a number of factors, including technological developments in transportation
and storage, increasing incomes both in the United States and worldwide, and changes in
consumers tastes and preferences which favor fruits and vegetables in the diet.  National
markets for labor intensive commodities, once protected by trade barriers and the perishability
of the commodities themselves, have now become global markets, due to technological
improvements and the strong drive for freer trade that has occurred over the past two decades.
Although it has been little regarded in policy circles, U.S. farmers have participated fully
in the dramatic growth in domestic and world markets for labor intensive agricultural
commodities.  U.S. farm receipts from fruit and horticultural specialties have more than
doubled, and from vegetables more than tripled, since 1980.  Labor intensive commodities are
the fastest growing sector of U.S. agriculture.  At the same time, agricultural labor productivity
has also continued to improve.  As a result, while production of labor intensive commodities has
expanded dramatically over the past two decades, average hired farm employment has declined
by about one quarter.  But the expansion of labor intensive agriculture has created tens of
thousands of new nonfarm jobs for U.S. workers in the upstream and downstream occupations
that support the production and handling of farm products.
Aliens have always been a significant source of agricultural labor in the United States. 
In particular, labor from Mexico has supported the development of irrigated agriculture in the
western states from the inception of the industry.  As the U.S. economy has expanded,
generating millions of new job opportunities, and as domestic farm workers have been freed
from the necessity to migrate by the extension of unemployment insurance to agricultural3
workers in 1976, and the federal government has spent billions of dollars to settle domestic
migratory farm workers out of the migrant stream and train them for permanent jobs in their
home communities, domestic farmworkers have moved out of the hired agricultural work force,
especially the migrant work force,.  These domestic workers have been replaced by alien
workers, largely from Mexico, central America and the Caribbean.  
As a result, the U.S. agricultural work force has become increasingly alien and
increasingly undocumented.  The U.S. Department of Labor’s National Agricultural Worker
Survey (NAWS) in 1997 reported that 36 percent of seasonal agricultural workers working in
the United States self-identified as not authorized to work in the United States.  This was an
increase from only about 12 percent a decade earlier.  More than 70 percent of the new
seasonal agricultural labor force entrants in the 1997 NAWS report self identified as not
authorized to work.  We understand that the new NAWS survey, due out shortly, will show
that more than half of the seasonal agricultural work force is not authorized to work in the
United States.
Throughout this period there has also been a legal alien agricultural worker admission
program.  This program was enacted as the H-2 program in the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952.  In 1956 Congress attempted to streamline the program and redesignated it H-
2A.  In recent years use of the H-2A program has declined to a low of approximately 15,000
workers annually, although in the past two years the number of admissions has increased
substantially and will probably exceed 30,000 workers this year.
The H-2A program has been used principally on the east coast in fruit, vegetables,
tobacco and, until recently, sugar cane.  The program’s structure and requirements evolved
from government-to-government treaty programs which preceded it.  Over the years the
program has become encrusted with regulations promulgated by the Department of Labor and
adverse legal decisions generated by opponents of the program which have rendered it
unworkable and uneconomic for many agricultural employers who face labor shortages.  Now
that government policy is eliminating the illegal alien work force, many growers are caught
between an unworkable and uneconomical H-2A program and the prospect of insufficient labor
to operate their businesses.
The illegal alien seasonal agricultural work force in the United States consists of two
groups.  Some are aliens who have permanently immigrated to the United States and have
found employment in agriculture.  Typically these permanent immigrant illegal aliens move into
nonagricultural industries after they become settled in the United States.  The other component
of the illegal alien seasonal agricultural work force is nonimmigrant migrant farm workers who
have homes and families in Mexico.  Many of them are small peasant farmers.  The adult
workers from these families, usually males, migrate seasonally to the United States during the
summer months to do agricultural work.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that until recently the
number of such migrant illegal alien farmworkers working was substantial.  Now, as a result of
increasingly effective immigration control policies, some of these migrants are finding it4
necessary to remain in the United States during the off season for fear that they will not be able
to get back in or because of the high cost of doing so, while many others are finding it
impractical to continue their annual migration and are remaining in Mexico.
Congressional efforts to control illegal immigration began with the landmark Immigration
Control and Reform Act (IRCA) of 1986.  The theory of IRCA was to discourage illegal
immigration by requiring employers to see documents evidencing a legal right to work in the
United States, and thereby removing the “economic magnet” to illegal immigration.  It did not
work for at least three reasons.  One was that one of the motives for illegal immigration to the
U.S. was not simply to better one’s welfare, but to survive, literally and figuratively.  This
survival drive overwhelmed any fear of employer sanctions.  The second was that
Congressional concern about invasion of privacy and big brotherism resulted in an employment
documentation process that was so compromised that it was easily evaded by document
counterfeiting.  The third was that a serious effort to enforce IRCA, including the provisions
against document counterfeiting, was never mounted.  The result was that IRCA had little
impact on the volume of illegal immigration, and a perverse impact on the hiring process. 
Whereas previously an employer who suspected a prospective worker was illegal may have
been willing to risk refusing to hire that worker, with the discrimination provision of IRCA an
employer ran great risks in refusing to hire any worker who had genuine appearing documents,
even if the employer suspected the worker was illegal.
With the passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
(IRRIRA) in 1996, Congress recognized the failure of IRCA.  In IRRIRA Congress decided to
test the conventional wisdom that it was impossible to control illegal immigration at the border
by vastly augmenting the resources and personnel of the INS for border enforcement.  The
resources for interior enforcement of employer sanctions provisions were also augmented.  The
result has clearly been to make the process of illegal border crossing more expensive and
dangerous.  The anecdotal evidence from farm labor contractors and agricultural employers
across the United States is that many prospective border crossers, especially migrant
farmworkers and prospective migrant farmworkers, have been unable to cross the border or
have made the calculation that the cost of doing so is too high based on their prospective
earnings in the U.S.  We have received reports from all regions of the United States of reduced
numbers of workers and short crews, and this has been one of the major factors leading to the
labor shortages that were observed in the 1997 season and to an even greater degree in the
1998 season.  As INS continues to ramp up its border enforcement personnel, these shortages
appear to be becoming more and more severe, and we expect continue significant shortages
and crop losses in some crops and some regions.
Increased border enforcement has also had a perverse effect.  It apparently has
induced some alien farm workers, who in the past crossed the border illegally on a seasonal
basis to work in the United States during the agricultural season, to remain in the United States
during the off season for fear that they would not be able to get back in the next year.  Some of
these workers eventually try to smuggle their families in to join them.  Many of these workers5
would prefer to maintain their homes and families in Mexico and work seasonally in the United
States, but current immigration policies make this an unattractive option.
IRRIRA also set in motion the testing of a process which many believe is the only way
to effectively control the employment of illegal aliens.  IRRIRA established a program of pilot
projects for verification of the authenticity of employment authorization documents at the time of
hire.  These projects are about midway through a 4 year pilot phase.  Presumably, at the end of
that time Congress will revisit the question of requiring mandatory document verification at the
time of hire.  If and when this happens, there will be a real crisis in agriculture, given the fact that
upwards of 60 to 70 percent of the industry’s seasonal work force apparently has fraudulent
documents.
In addition to the increasing effectiveness of border enforcement activities, additional
INS resources for enforcement of employer sanctions is increasing the frequency of audits of I-
9 forms.  The I-9 form is the document completed by an employer and employee at the time of
hire on which the employer records the employment verification documents the employee offers
to verify the legal right to work in the United States.  Employers are required to accept the
documents offered by the worker if they reasonably appear on their face to be genuine, a test
which virtually all documents meet.  However, when INS does an audit of the employer’s I-9
forms, the INS checks the authenticity of the employment authorization documents against
government data bases, something it is precluded by case law and INS policy from doing at the
request of an employer.  At the conclusion of the audit, the employer receives a list from the
INS of the workers whose documents have been determined to be invalid.   Frequently, INS
audits of agricultural employers reveal that 60 to 70 percent of seasonal agricultural workers
have provided fraudulent documents.  The employer is then required to dismiss each employee
on the list who cannot provide a valid employment authorization document, something few can
do.  
Independently of the effort to improve immigration control, other forces are also
affecting the agricultural work place.  The Social Security Administration (SSA) is under a
Congressional mandate to reduce the amount of wage reporting to non existent social security
accounts.  Through its Enumeration Verification System (EVS), the Social Security
Administration is now checking employers’ tax filing electronically within a matter of days or
weeks after they are filed to match names and social security numbers reported by employers
with those in the SSA data base.  Employers receive lists of mismatches with instructions to
“correct the mistakes in reporting”.  Of course, in most cases the mismatch is not a result of a
mistake in reporting, but a fraudulent number.  When the employer engages the employee to
“correct the mistake” the employee disappears.  
It is not uncommon for employers to receive lists of mismatches from the SSA
containing 50 percent or more of the names which the employer reported to the SSA. 
Contronting  the employees on these lists can have devastating effects on an employers work
force.  On the other hand, employers are concerned about their future liability under the6
employer sanctions provisions if they do not act on the SSA lists.  The existence of lists from
the SSA that the employer had allegedly not acted upon were cited in a recent INS prosecution
of an agricultural employer for knowingly employing illegal aliens.
While the incidence of INS I-9 audits is still relatively low, very large numbers of
agricultural employers are receiving lists of mismatched numbers from the SSA.  Thus many
agricultural employers are having to confront for the first time the reality of the legal status of
their work force.  Both the I-9 audits and the SSA verification program are having a churning
effect on the agricultural work force.   Farmworkers with fraudulent documents are rarely
picked up and removed.  Instead the employer is required to dismiss them.  In effect they are
being chased from farmer to farmer as their employers receive  SSA reports or are audited by
the INS.
Increased border enforcement, increased interior enforcement and increased SSA
verification activity have led to reductions in labor availability and destabilization of the
agricultural work force.  These trends will continue.  The increase in border enforcement
personnel authorized by IRRIRA will not be complete until FY 2002.  The SSA plans to
continue lowering its threshold for rejection of employer tax returns due to name/number
mismatches. These factors, coupled with the extraordinarily high levels of nonagricultural
employment, have resulted in increasing frequency of farm labor shortages and crop losses. 
The problem is rapidly reaching crisis proportions, and could easily do so in the 2000 growing
season.
Some opponents of an alien agricultural worker program argue that a program is not
needed because employer sanctions cannot be effectively enforced no matter what the
government tries to do.  The implication of this argument is that employers should endure the
uncertainties and potential economic catastrophe of losing a workforce and workers should
continue to endure the uncertainties of being chased from job to job on a moment’s notice.  We
find such reasoning unacceptable.  It is an argument for the status quo, which all agree is
unacceptable.  Furthermore, it is unacceptable to refuse to address one public policy problem
on the grounds that another accepted and enacted public policy will be ineffective.  We must
honestly face the issues that our policy of immigration control and employer sanctions confronts
us with.   We believe that calls for a workable alien agricultural worker program.
Are there viable alternatives to an alien agricultural worker program?
Opponents of the employment of an alien agricultural worker program suggest there are
other ways to address the problem that would result from the removal of the illegal alien
agricultural work force than the legal admission of alien agricultural workers.
One approach that is suggested is that agricultural employers should be “left to compete
in the labor market just like other employers have to do”.   Under this scenario there would be
no alien guestworkers.  To secure legal workers and remain in business, agricultural employers7
would attract sufficient workers away from competing nonagricultural employers by raising
wages and benefits.  Those who could not afford to compete would go out of business or move
their production outside the United States.  Meanwhile, according to this scenario, those
domestic persons remaining in farm work would enjoy higher wages and improved working
conditions.
There are several observations one must make about this “solution”.  
No informed person seriously contends that wages, benefits and working conditions in
seasonal agricultural jobs can be raised sufficiently to attract workers away from their
permanent nonagricultural jobs in the numbers needed to replace the illegal alien agricultural
work force and maintain the economic competitiveness of  U.S. producers.  Thus this scenario
predicates that U.S. agricultural production would decline.  In fact, given that the U.S. hired
agricultural work force is, by most estimates, about 70 percent illegal, it would decline
dramatically.  
Seasonal farm jobs have attributes which make them inherently uncompetitive with
nonfarm work.  First and foremost is that they are seasonal.  Many workers who could do
seasonal farm work accepted less than the average field and livestock worker earnings of $7.22
per hour in 1999 because they preferred the stability of a permanent job.  Secondly, many
seasonal farm jobs are located in rural areas away from centers of population.  Furthermore, to
extend the period of employment, workers must work at several such jobs in different areas. 
That is, they must become migrants.  It is highly unlikely that many U.S. workers would be
willing to become migrant farm workers at any wage, or for that matter that, as a matter of
public policy, we would want to encourage them to do so.  In fact, the U.S. government has
spent billions of dollars over the past several decades attempting to settle domestic workers out
of the migratory stream.  The success of these efforts is one of the factors that has led to the
expansion in illegal alien employment.  In addition to seasonality and migrancy, most farm jobs
are subject to the viscissitudes of weather, both hot and cold, and require physical strength and
stamina.  Thus it is highly unlikely that a significant domestic worker response would result even
from substantial increases in wages and benefits for seasonal farm work.
However, substantial increases in current U.S. farmworker wages and benefits can not
occur for economic reasons.  U.S. growers are in competition in the markets for most
agricultural commodities, including most labor intensive commodities, with actual and potential
growers around the globe.  Since hired labor constitutes approximately 35 percent of total
production costs of labor intensive agricultural commodities, and 1 in 8 dollars of production
costs for agricultural commodities generally, substantial increases in wage and/or benefit costs
will have a substantial impact on growers’ over-all production costs.  U.S. growers are in an
economically competitive equilibrium with foreign producers at approximately current
production costs.  Growers with substantially higher costs can not compete.  If U.S. producers’
production costs are forced up by, for example, restricting the supply of labor, U.S. production
will become uncompetitive in world markets (including domestic markets in which foreign8
producers compete).  U.S. producers will begin to be forced out of business.  In fact, U.S.
producers will continue to be forced out of business until the competition for domestic
farmworkers has diminished to the point where the remaining U.S. producers’ production costs
are approximately at current global equilibrium levels.  The end result of this process will be that
domestic farmworker wages and working conditions (and the production costs of surviving
producers) are at approximately current levels and the volume of domestic production has
declined sufficiently that there is no longer upward pressure on domestic worker wages.
These same global economic forces, of course, affect all businesses. But nonagricultural
employers have some options for responding to domestic labor shortages that agricultural
employers do not have.  Many nonagricultural employers can “foreign source” the labor
intensive components of their product or service without losing the good jobs.  Since
agricultural production is tied to the land, the labor intensive functions of the agricultural
production process cannot be foreign-sourced.  We cannot, for example, send the harvesting
process or the thinning process overseas.  Either the entire product is grown, harvested,
transported and in many cases initially processed in the United States, or all these functions are
done somewhere else, even though only one or two steps in the production process may be
highly labor intensive.  When the product is grown, harvested, transported and processed
somewhere else, all the jobs associated with these functions are exported, not just the seasonal
field jobs.  These are the so-called “upstream” and “downstream” jobs that support, and are
created by, the growing of agricultural products.  U.S. Department of Agriculture studies
indicate that there are about 3.1 such upstream and downstream jobs for every on-farm job. 
Most of these upstream and downstream jobs are “good” jobs, i.e. permanent, average or
better paying jobs held by citizens and permanent residents.  Thus we would be exporting about
three times as many jobs of U.S. citizens and permanent residents as we would farm jobs if we
shut off access to alien agricultural workers.
Another suggestion has been that recruitment of welfare recipients and the unemployed
could replace the illegal aliens.  Growers themselves, most notably the Neisi Farmers League in
the San Joaquin valley, have tried to augment their labor supply by recruiting welfare recipients. 
While these efforts have resulted in some former welfare recipients moving into jobs on farms,
the magnitude of this movement has been insignificant.  In fact, welfare directors suggest that the
long term impact of welfare reform is likely to exacerbate rather than reduce the shortage of
domestic farm labor.  Some seasonal farm workers currently depend on the combination of
farm work in-season and welfare assistance during the off season.  As limitations are set on
persons’ lifetime welfare entitlement, this pattern will no longer be viable.   Seasonal
farmworkers who supplement their earnings with welfare will be forced into permanent
nonagricultural jobs.  Other attributes of seasonal farm work are also deterrents.   The
preponderance of those now remaining on the welfare rolls are single mothers with young
children.  Many are not physically capable of doing farm work, do not have transportation into
the rural areas and are occupied with the care of young children.9
The unemployed also make, at best, a marginal contribution to the hired farm work
force.  Currently, the U.S. is enjoying historically low levels of unemployment and many labor
markets are essentially at or above full employment.  However, relatively high unemployment
rates in some rural agricultural counties are often cited as evidence of an available labor supply
or even of a farmworker surplus.  First it should be noted that labor markets with a heavy
presence of seasonal agriculture will always have higher unemployment rates than labor markets
with a higher proportion of year round employment.  By the very nature of the fact that farm
work is seasonal, many seasonal farmworkers spend a portion of the year unemployed. 
Second, unemployed workers tend to share the same values as employed workers.  They
prefer permanent employment which is not physically demanding and takes place in an inside
environment.  They share an aversion to migrancy, and often have transportation and other
limitations that restrict their access to jobs.  The coexistence of unemployed workers and
employers with labor shortages in the same labor markets means only that we have a system
that enables workers to exercise choices.
Many welfare recipients and unemployed workers can not or will not do agricultural
work.  It is reasonable to expect an alien worker program to have a credible mechanism to
assure that domestic workers who are willing and able to do farm work have first access to
agricultural jobs, and that aliens do not displace U.S. workers.  It is not reasonable to expect or
insist that welfare and unemployment rolls fall to zero as a condition for the admission of alien
workers.
A third alternative to alien workers often suggested is to replace labor with technology,
including mechanization. This argument holds that if agricultural employers were denied access
to alien labor they would have an incentive to develop mechanization to replace the alien labor.
Alternatively, it is argued that the availability of alien labor retards mechanization and growth in
worker productivity.
The argument that availability of alien labor creates a disincentive for mechanization is
belied by the history of the past two decades.  From 1980 to the present the output of labor
intensive agricultural commodities has risen dramatically while hired agricultural employment has
declined.  The only way this could have happened is as a result of significant agricultural labor
productivity increases.  Yet this was also the period of perhaps the greatest influx of illegal alien
farmworkers in our history.
 
It does not appear that there has been a great deal of increase in agricultural
mechanization in fruit and vegetable farming since a spasm of innovation and development in the
1960’s and 1970’s.  Indeed, some of the mechanization developed during that period,
specifically mechanical apple harvesters, have proven to be uneconomical in the long term
because of tree damage as well as fruit damage.  Agricultural engineers claim the reason for this
is the withdrawal of support for agricultural mechanization research by the U.S. Department of
Agriculture following protests and litigation by farmworkers in California that such research was
taking away their jobs.10
But productivity increases can result from many different factors, of which
mechanization is only one.  Smaller fruit trees, which require less ladder climbing, trellised trees,
and changes in the way trees or vines are pruned are also technological developments which
improve labor productivity.  The switch from boxes and small containers to bulk bins and
pallets in the field has significantly improved labor productivity of some harvesting activities. 
Use of production techniques and crop varieties that increase yields also improves field labor
productivity by making harvesting and other operations more efficient.  These appear to be the
techniques that farmers have used to achieve the large productivity increases obtained in the
1980’s and 1990’s.  The fact that there appears to have been a slowing down in the pace of
mechanization itself does not mean that growth in worker productivity has slowed. 
The argument that alien employment retards productivity increases is also belied by
logic.  The incentive for the adoption of mechanization or any other productivity increasing
innovation is to reduce unit production costs.  If the innovation results in a net savings in
production costs it will be adopted.  It doesn’t matter whether the dollar saved is a dollar of
domestic worker wages or a dollar of alien worker wages.  On the other hand, if the innovation
results in a net increase in production costs, it will not be adopted.  The only way one can argue
that a reduction in alien labor will increase the incentive to mechanize is to argue that the
reduction in alien labor will first increase production costs.  But if, as is argued elsewhere in this
testimony, the tendency for domestic producers costs to rise in response to a withdrawal of
labor is offset by shifting domestic market share to foreign producers, the incentive for
additional domestic mechanization will never occur.  In a global market, the profitability of
mechanization, just like the profitability of everything else, is determined by global production
costs, not by domestic production costs.
A fourth alternative to the importation of alien farm workers which has been suggested
is the unionization of the farm work force.  The implication of this scenario is that unionization
would augment the supply of legal seasonal farmworkers and make alien farm workers
unnecessary.   Alternatively, it is argued that an alien agricultural worker program will make it
more difficult for domestic farmworkers to unionize and improve their economic welfare.
First it should be noted that use of the H-2A program as a strike breaking tool is
expressly prohibited.  H-2A workers may not be employed in any job opportunity which is
vacant because the former occupant of the job is on strike or involved in a labor dispute. 
Secondly, there is no impediment to an H-2A worker becoming a union member.  Indeed, the
H-2A program has been used for decades in unionized citrus operations in Arizona.  Recently,
a farmworker union supported a grower’s H2-A application as a means of providing legal
status for its own members.  If an employer seeking labor certification has a collective
bargaining agreement and a union shop, the H-2A aliens, like all other employees, can be
required to pay union dues and may become union members.
But there is no reason to believe that unionization will result in an increase in the
availability of legal labor, nor, indeed, any reason to believe that the membership of farmworker11
unions is more legal than the rest of the agricultural work force.  Farmworker unions and farm
employers are fishing out of the same labor force pool.  The argument that increased
farmworker unionization will increase the supply of legal labor is based on the supposition that
farmworker unions will be successful in negotiating higher wages and more attractive working
conditions than in nonunion settings, and that this will attract more domestic legal labor.  Yet
wages and working conditions in union and nonunion settings are not (and in competitive global
markets cannot be) significantly different. Furthermore, the same reasons described above why
higher wages and benefits for seasonal agricultural work, even if they were economically
feasible, would not attract significantly more legal workers into seasonal agricultural work, are
as applicable in a union setting as in a nonunion setting.
The reality is that an alien agricultural worker program is probably union-neutral. 
Existence of such a program will probably not make it significantly more difficult or easier to
organize farm workers.
Why does the H-2A program need to be reformed?  
There are two broad reasons why the H-2A program needs to be reformed.
 First, the program is administratively cumbersome and costly.  Even at its present level
of admission, fewer than 30,000 workers annually, the program is nearly paralyzed.  Secondly,
the program sets minimum wage and benefit standards that many employers cannot afford or
cannot qualify for.  As a result, the program’s “worker protections” are cosmetic.  They
“protect” only about 30,000 job opportunities in an agricultural work force estimated at more
than 2 million.  The vast majority of agricultural workers, legal and illegal, get little or no benefit
from the H-2A “protections”.
The first reason why the current H-2A program must be reformed is that it is
administratively cumbersome and costly.  The regulations governing the program cover 33
pages of the Code of Federal Regulations.  ETA Handbook No. 398, the compendium of
guidance on program operation, is more than 300 pages.   As a result of a recent change,
employers must apply for workers a minimum of 45 days in advance of the date workers are
needed.  Applications, which often run more than a dozen pages, are wordsmithed by
employers, by the Labor Department and by legal services attorneys.  Endless discussions and
arguments occur over sentences, phrases and words.  After all this fine tuning, workers see an
abbreviated summary of the order if they see anything at all.  In hearings in Oregon this spring
workers often testified that they were referred to H-2A jobs without even being told the wage
rate that was offered.
Each employer applicant goes through a prescribed recruitment and advertising
procedure, regardless of whether the same process has been undertaken for the same
occupation by another employer only days earlier.  The required advertising is strictly controlled
by the regulations and looks more like a legal notice than a help wanted ad.  Increasingly, the12
Labor Department is requiring that advertising be placed in major metropolitan dailies, rather
than the local newspapers that farm job seekers are most likely to read, if they look for farm
work in help wanted ads at all.  The advertisements rarely result in responses, yet they are
repeated over and over again, year in and year out.
Certifications are required by law to be issued not less than 30 days before the date of
need, but the GAO reported in 1997 that they were issued late more than 40 percent of the
time.
Even after all this, the employer has no assurance that the “domestic” workers referred
to it are, in fact, legal.  Most state job services refuse even to request employment verification
documents, much less verify that they are valid.  It is the experience of H-2A employers that a
substantial and increasing proportion of the “domestic” workers referred, and on the basis of
which certification to employ legal alien workers is denied, are in fact illegal aliens themselves. 
State employment service officials have even been known to suggest to H-2A growers that they
should go back to employing illegal aliens and save themselves and the employment service all
the hassle.
Finally, a high proportion of the workers referred to H-2A employers and on the basis
of which the employer is denied labor certification for a job opportunity, either fail to report for
work or quit within a few hours or days.  This then forces the employer to file with the Labor
Department for a “redetermination of need”.  Even though redeterminations are usually
processed within a few days, the petition and admission process after redetermination means
that aliens will, at best, arrive about 2 weeks late.
The second reason why reform is needed is that the current H-2A program requires
wage and benefit standards that are unreasonably rigid or not economically feasible in many
agricultural jobs, and effectively exclude those jobs from participating in the H-2A program.
The so-called Adverse Effect Wage Rate (AEWR) is one such standard.  The Adverse
Effect Wage Rate is a minimum wage set on a state-by-state basis by regulation, and is
applicable to workers employed in job opportunities for which an employer has received a
labor certification.  The Adverse Effect Wage Rate standard is unique to the H-2A program
and does not exist in any other immigration or labor certification program.  It was established to
create a minimum wage standard in jobs where foreign workers were employed, because the
federal minimum wage law did not cover agriculture at that time.  AEWRs were initially set at
the level of the then non-agricultural federal minimum wage.  Over time, AEWRs were adjusted
by a variety of methodologies.  Since 1987, each state’s AEWR is set at the average hourly
earnings of field and livestock workers for the previous year in the state or a small region of
contiguous states.  For the 1999 season, AEWRs range from $6.39 per hour in West Virginia,
Kentucky and Tennessee to $7.76 per hour in Iowa and Missouri.  The average AEWR is
$7.22 per hour.13
The AEWR sets a minimum wage standard that makes it uneconomical to use the H-
2A program in many agricultural occupations.  The AEWR standard, in effect, makes the
average wage in one year the minimum wage in the ensuing year.  Since the AEWR is set at the
average of the wages for all agricultural workers in the state, it will be above the actual wages
paid for about half of the agricultural employment in the state, and below the actual wage for
about half of all agricultural employment in the state.   Obviously, this standard will not be a
deterrent in using the H-2A program in occupations in which the actual wage is above the
average wage for all agricultural occupations.   But it can be an uncompetitive and unrealistic
standard for an occupation in which the actual wage is below the average of all agricultural
wages in the state.  Since, by definition, half of all employment will always have an actual wage
below the average wage, this standard will always set an uncompetitive wage for some
occupations, no matter how much agricultural wages rise.
Another example of an unreasonably rigid standard is the requirement to provide
housing.  The current H-2A program requires an employer to have housing for all the job
opportunities for which an employer applies for labor certification except those job
opportunities from which local workers will commute daily from their permanent residences,
and to provide that housing at no charge to the workers.  Agricultural employers are only
required to provide housing to workers if they participate in the H-2A program or use the
Department of Labor’s interstate clearance system to recruit workers.  Only a tiny fraction of
U.S. agricultural employers do either.
The U.S. Department of Agriculture stopped reporting the percentage of hired
agricultural employment that included employer-provided housing after 1995.  But up to that
time only about 15 percent of agricultural employment included employer-provided housing,
either free or at a charge.  Given that this percentage had remained relatively unchanged for
many years, it probably reflects current practice reasonably accurately.  Since many employers
who provide housing do so only for year round employees such as foremen and supervisors, it
is likely that the proportion of seasonal workers provided housing is even lower.  In other
words, the vast majority of seasonal agricultural workers currently arrange their own housing. 
Employer-provided housing tends to be provided to seasonal workers only in those areas
dependent on migrant workers that are so remote that community-based housing is unavailable.
The requirement for employer-provided housing is one of the greatest current obstacles
to expanded use of the legal alien agricultural worker program.  Providing housing is extremely
expensive, and there are many other community obstacles to overcome as well.  In areas where
the housing stock is already adequate to accommodate the seasonal agricultural work force,
agricultural employers are understandably reluctant to invest large sums to construct employer-
provided housing.  Even where the housing stock is not currently adequate, employers are
reluctant to invest in housing unless there is assurance of a workable program for securing labor
to live in the housing.14
There certainly can be no disputing the proposition that there must be adequate housing
for both domestic and alien seasonal agricultural workers.  The policy question then is under
what conditions this housing should be employer-provided, and in those circumstances how we
get from where we are now to a situation where there is adequate employer-provided housing.15
What reforms are needed?
The H-2A program must be reformed by modernizing and streamlining the
administrative processes, especially the procedures for domestic worker recruitment and the
labor market test, and eliminating those administrative requirements that add cost or inflexibility
to the program without providing any corresponding benefits to domestic farmworkers.
Rather than the cumbersome and antiquated paper process of the interstate clearance
system, and the expensive and unproductive advertising that are now used to disseminate
information about available jobs and to recruit domestic workers, NCAE has suggested
bringing this process into the 21st century.  We have suggested a computerized farmworker
registry system modeled after the Labor Department’s America’s Job Bank and America’s
Talent Bank systems.  Domestic workers who were interested in seasonal farm work would list
themselves and their interests and experience with the registry.  They would indicate whether
they were only interested in working locally or whether they were also willing to consider work
in other areas and/or, if they choose, specify specific areas.  Growers who wanted to
participate in the H-2A program would be required to list their jobs with the registry.  Job
offers listed with the registry would be examined to assure they included the required terms and
conditions of employment, just as paper job orders are now scrutinized.  If a job met the
program requirements, the registry would be searched to identify qualified workers who might
be interested in filling the job.  Qualified workers would be provided with the information about
the job and asked if they were interested in taking the job.  Information about qualified
domestic workers who had accepted the job would be provided to the employer.  To the
extent that sufficient qualified workers could not be located who were willing to accept the jobs,
the employer would receive a “shortage report” authorizing the employment of sufficient aliens
to fill the unmet need.  Upon receipt of the shortage report the employer would be authorized to
import sufficient aliens to fill the employer’s need or to employ H-2A aliens already in the
United States who were available for new assignments.  In short, this process would work
exactly as the current job service recruitment system now works in filling H-2A jobs, except
that it would utilize 21st century technology rather than early 20th century technology.
Employers who used the registry and the Labor Department would be required to
widely advertise the existence of the registry to potential farm workers.  To assure that workers
who were referred through the registry were, in fact, legal workers, the registry would check
the validity of work authorization documents through the INS and the Social Security
Administration, before listing the worker on the registry.  This check would not obligate the
worker to do anything more than show valid work authorization documents, just as the law
currently requires.  The registry would also presumably be able to assist workers whose
documents did not pass the validation check, but who were, in fact, authorized to work to
correct the problem with their documents.
Secondly, the program must be reformed to establish realistic wage and benefit
standards that will, in fact, assure the economic viability of the jobs as well as providing benefits16
to the workers.  This is an essential balance that must be struck.  To claim that wage and benefit
standards “protect” domestic workers when jobs at those wage and benefit level do not exist
and are not economically competitive, is deceptive and ultimately harmful to farmworkers.
The Adverse Effect Wage Rate (AEWR) must be replaced with a wage standard which
is related to the competitive market wage in the occupation.  NCAE has suggested that the
prevailing wage in the occupation and area of employment be set as the minimum wage for
employers to qualify for legal alien agricultural labor.  In the H-2A program the prevailing wage
is defined as the 51st percentile of wages of workers in the occupation and area of employment. 
This standard assures that employers who pay substandard wages are not permitted to employ
aliens, but sets a standard that is viable in a competitive market.  (Employers would still, of
course, be subject to the federal, state or local minimum wage, if higher.)
The prevailing wage in the occupation and area of employment has widespread
application and acceptance in other wage regulation programs.  For example, it is the minimum
wage for federal contractors under the Davis-Bacon and Service Contract Acts.  It is difficult
to understand how the prevailing wage standard could be good public policy in one setting and
bad public policy in another.
A second reform that is needed is to provide flexibility in the provision of housing. 
Flexibility is needed both to enable employers to initially get into the program in order to
provide legal status for their current illegal work force, and to accommodate circumstances
where there is adequate housing in the community to accommodate the seasonal farm work
force.
As noted above, only about 15 percent of agricultural employment currently includes
employer-provided housing, and the percentage is probably lower for seasonal agricultural
workers.  For employers without housing, a transition period is needed to enable employers to
meet housing requirement.  If agricultural employers have a workable, functioning program for
the legal employment of alien workers, they (and their lenders) will have the confidence to
invest in additional housing.  Such a transition period does not mean lessening farmworker
benefits.  Most farmworkers are not now provided housing, and any mechanism which
increases the housing stock will benefit farmworkers.
In addition to a transition period, some assistance in financing farmworker housing will
be needed.  The U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) has
a program of low interest loans to assist farmers and community organizations to provide in-
season migrant housing.  However, the regulations governing the program preclude housing
aliens in the housing and set unrealistically restrictive standards for employer borrowers.  The
FmHA rules for migrant housing programs needs to be reformed, or some other mechanism for
assisting in the funding of in-season migrant housing for domestic and alien farmworkers must
be found.17
Employers also face daunting community opposition when trying to construct migrant
farmworker housing.  Even employers who were willing and able to finance the housing have
been prevented from constructing it by community opposition.  While there is widespread
agreement that there should be adequate housing for migrant workers, the not-in-my-backyard
response quickly arises when actual projects are proposed.  This opposition can take the form
of  restrictive zoning, unrealistic construction standards, or outright opposition to the presence
of migrant farm workers.  Some mechanism is needed to assist farmers who want to construct
migrant housing that meets federal migrant labor camp standards on their own property to pre-
empt local restrictions.
Finally, flexibility should exist in the way housing is required to be provided.  The vast
majority of seasonal farmworkers are currently living off the farm.  Some agricultural
communities have adequate housing for seasonal farm workers, and experience shows that
many farmworkers prefer not to live on the farms.  Some communities do not have adequate
housing for seasonal farmworkers, and in those communities the housing stock must be
increased.  But the current requirement that the employer maintain a housing unit for every
migrant worker, whether or not the worker chooses to live in it, leads to the absurd situation
where employers must maintain vacant housing merely to meet the standard to qualify for H-2A
certification, while the workers live elsewhere.  NCAE has proposed that in communities where
the housing stock is adequate to accommodate the seasonal agricultural work force, that
employers be allowed the option of providing a monetary housing allowance in lieu of
employer-provided housing.  This has been portrayed as reducing farmworker benefits.  In fact,
workers are now living in this housing without the benefit of housing allowances.  Clearly the
provision of housing or a housing allowance will increase farmworker benefits.
A third reform that is needed is to amend the IRRIRA to assure that the current
agricultural work force can obtain legal status under the program.  NCAE would propose going
even further and permitting aliens who have made a commitment to working in the United
States and complying with the law, and who want to apply for permanent residency, to have a
realistic opportunity to become permanent residents.
Under the current provisions of the IRRIRA, persons who have accumulated 365 days
or more in illegal status in the United States after April, 1998 are debarred from immigration
benefits for a period of 10 years.  Admission to the United States as an alien worker is one
such immigration benefit.  Thus, this provision would debar most aliens who are currently in the
U.S. agricultural work force from participating in the H-2A program, reformed or otherwise. 
Employers who choose to use the program would have to recruit a whole new work force of
persons who were not inadmissible under the bar – in effect, persons who had not previously
worked in the United States.  This makes no sense whatsoever, and would cause chaos in the
agricultural industry as well as in the immigrant community.  Clearly the logical solution is to
provide a waiver of the IRRIRA bar to aliens who wish to continue working as legal seasonal
agricultural workers.18
NCAE also feels that aliens who participate in the U.S. seasonal agricultural work
force, who contribute to the U.S. economy, and who abide by U.S. law, including the
requirements of the H-2A program while they are H-2A workers, should have a realistic
opportunity to move up into permanent agricultural work and greater responsibilities and
earnings, or to move up and out of the agricultural work force if they so desire.  For many
participants in the seasonal agricultural work force, seasonal agricultural work is an entry level
occupation.  They ultimately aspire to better jobs in or out of agriculture.  We believe it is unjust
to accept the work and dedication of alien farm workers as seasonal agricultural workers, but
deny them the reasonable aspirations that accompany dedication to this work.  On the other
hand, it is our belief, based on the close association of our members with their farmworkers,
that many persons who do farm work for a period in the United States do not want to live here
permanently, bring their families here, or become permanent residents.  They want to maintain
their homes and families in their native land.  They look at employment in the United States as a
way of sustaining their families or launching a better life in their native country.  We believe that
so long as the individuals are contributing, law abiding members of our community, both options
should be open to them.
What will be the impact of a reformed H-2A program on farm workers?  
For domestic farmworkers, the reformed program will assure them first access to all
agricultural jobs before they are filled by legal alien labor.  It will assure that this access is real,
by assuring that there is widespread and easy assess to information about the available jobs.  It
will protect the wages in jobs approved for the employment of aliens by making the prevailing
wage the minimum wage – in effect a Davis-Bacon Act for farmworkers.  It will assure housing
or a housing allowance and transportation benefits to migrant farmworkers who have no such
assurance at present.  In short, it will raise the standards for domestic farmworkers in all H-2A-
approved occupations.
It will also provide all of the above benefits for currently illegal alien farmworkers, the
majority of the seasonal agricultural work force.  In addition, it will free them from the fear,
indignity and economic costs of apprehension and removal, or of being thrown out of work on a
moment’s notice.  It will also free them from dependence on “coyotes” and the costs and
physical dangers of illegal entry.
For domestic workers in the upstream and downstream jobs that are created and
sustained by U.S. agricultural production, it will assure the continuation and growth in these
employment opportunities.
For agricultural employers, it will assure them an adequate, legal work force if they are
willing and able to meet the requirements of the program.  It will give employers the certainty
that will enable them to plan their businesses and make investments more effectively. 19
Why is a workable alien agricultural worker program good public policy?
In the absence of effective control of illegal immigration  and enforcement of employer
sanctions, the status quo will continue --  illegal alien migration, little use of the legal alien
worker program, fewer protections for domestic and alien farmworkers, crop losses due to
shortages of workers, and vulnerability to random INS enforcement action for employers.  This
will be true whether or not the legal guestworker program is reformed, because without
effective immigration control and document verification, agricultural employers as well as all
other employers will continue to be confronted by a workforce with valid appearing documents
and no practical way to know who is legal and who is not.  No one can defend or advocate for
continuation of the status quo.  The current system of illegal immigration and an agricultural
industry dependent on a fraudulently documented workforce is bad for employers, workers and
the nation.
But if the nation achieves reasonably effective control of illegal immigration and
enforcement of employer sanctions – which is the objective of current public policy – then
agricultural production in the United States, particularly of the labor intensive fruit, vegetables
and horticultural commodities, will be drastically reduced, with attendant displacement of
domestic workers in upstream and downstream jobs, unless a workable agricultural
guestworker program exists. 
In conducting the public policy debate on creation of a workable alien agricultural
worker program, it is important to be realistic about what the public policy options are and are
not.  The public policy options are not between greater and lesser economic benefits for
domestic farmworkers.  The level of wages and benefits that U.S. agriculture can sustain for all
farmworkers, domestic and alien, are largely determined in the global market place.  The public
policy options we face are between a larger domestic agricultural industry employing domestic
and legal alien farmworkers and providing greater employment opportunities for domestic off-
farm workers, and a drastically smaller domestic agricultural industry and drastically fewer
employment opportunities for domestic off-farm workers with a wholly domestic farm work
force.  In either case, the level of economic returns to farmworkers will be approximately the
same, namely those economic returns that are sustainable in the competitive global marketplace. 
The National Council of Agricultural Employers believes the national interest is best
served by effective immigration control and a workable alien agricultural worker program that
enables the United States to realize its full potential for the production of labor intensive and
other agricultural commodities in a competitive global marketplace, and which supports a high
level of employment for domestic workers in upstream and downstream jobs while assuring
reasonable protections for domestic and alien farmworkers.  The Council believes an alien
agricultural worker program that is workable and competitive for employers and that protects
access to jobs and the wages and working conditions of domestic farmworkers, and that20
provides legal status, dignity and protections to alien farmworkers working in the United States,
is important to accomplish now.  But we do not believe it is the end of the job.
We also believe that there are other important public policy issues related to seasonal
agricultural workers.  Many individuals and families that engage in seasonal agricultural work
face serious economic and social problems that should be addressed.  Seasonal farm work
alone is not sufficient to sustain a reasonable standard of living for most persons who engage in
farm work at any reasonable wage rate.  There are serious problems of housing, medical care
and child care for workers who migrate, especially with families, and for persons who engage in
intermittent employment or work for many different employers.  Many of these problems extend
far beyond the work place.  In fact, for this component of our population, it is when they are
not working that these problems are most severe.
Conclusion  
The National Council of Agricultural Employers stands ready to work with domestic
farmworker and immigrant groups not only to develop a workable alien agricultural worker
program, but to find workable solutions to the social and economic problems of those who
engage in seasonal farm work.  During the past several months, NCAE has reached out to
worker, immigrant and church groups to explore solutions to these problems along with our
need for a stable legal work force.  These issues should be addressed now.  Congress should
not wait any longer to fix an indefensible status quo.  Agricultural employers and worker
advocates should put their differences aside and jointly work to solve these problems.  We
cannot afford to turn away from this challenge.  The economic and social costs are too high.